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Commercial agency and the duty to act in good faith 
Andrea Tosato* 
Abstract– Under Directive 86/653/EEC on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States 
relating to self-employed commercial agents (the ‘Directive’), commercial agents have an 
obligation to act ‘dutifully and in good faith’ (the ‘Obligation’). This article considers the 
impact that this general good faith clause has had upon the UK legal order. It first analyses the 
Obligation, assessing its scope, function and content. It then reviews the choices made by the 
UK legislature in implementing this duty and scrutinises the manner in which it has been 
construed and applied by UK courts, as well as commentators. Finally, it charts the areas of the 
pre-existing body of rules governing principals and agents at common law that are affected by 
this imported notion and appraises the resulting alterations to the positive law. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, good faith1 has progressively permeated the private law sphere of 
the EU legal order, appearing with increasing frequency in legislation, jurisprudence and soft 
law.2  
This development did not give rise to theoretical difficulties in civil law Member States, as 
good faith was already an integral part of their legal frameworks.3 By contrast, pre-existing 
legal paradigms were challenged more acutely in common law jurisdictions, due to their 
traditional diffidence towards “general clauses”4 and historical aversion to good faith as a core 
concept of private law.5 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Nottingham, email: andrea.tosato@nottingham.ac.uk. I owe 
thanks to Professors Howard Bennett, Hugh Collins, and Francis Reynolds, along with Dr Richard Hyde for their 
comments on earlier drafts. My gratitude also goes to the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions. All 
errors are my own.  
1 Traditionally, legal scholarship distinguishes between subjective and objective good faith. Subjective good faith 
typically designates a state of mind and serves as a condition for the acquisition of definite rights. Objective good 
faith identifies a specific standard of conduct to be applied in relation to the behaviour of contracting parties or 
for the interpretation of the law or the construction of legally relevant acts (eg. contracts, deeds, wills). In some 
legal cultures, this distinction is clearly demarcated in the language: for example, in German “Treu und Glauben” 
and “Guter Glaube” are used to designate objective and subjective good faith respectively. 
This paper is only concerned with objective good faith. Accordingly, the expression “good faith” exclusively 
refers to “objective good faith”, unless otherwise specified. 
2 For a recent overview see Norbert Reich, General principles of EU civil law (Intersentia 2013) 189-213. 
3 See Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, ‘Good faith in European contract law surveying the legal 
landscape’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), Good faith in European contract law (CUP 
2000) 1. 
4 For an exhaustive analysis see Stefan Grundmann and Denis Mazeaud, General Clauses and Standards in 
European Contract Law (Kluwer 2005). 
5 Classically, Roger Brownsword, ‘Good Faith in Contracts Revisited’ (1996) 49 CLP 111. In Scots law, Hector 
MacQueen, ‘Good faith in the Scots law of contract: an undisclosed principle?’ in ADM Forte (ed), Good Faith 
in Contract and Property Law (Hart 1999) 5. Cf Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited 
[2013] EWHC 111 (QB); Simon Whittaker, ‘Good faith, implied terms and commercial contracts’ (2013) 129 
LQR 463. 
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Against this backdrop, legal scholars have devoted great attention to the implementation of EU 
good faith into the UK legal framework, expressing a veritable constellation of views, ranging 
from cautious enthusiasm to unapologetic scepticism.6 The significance of this notion in the 
consumer acquis directives and its impact on pre-existing English contract law have been the 
subject of lively scholarly debate.7 In like vein, the role of good faith in the Common European 
Sales Law (CESL)8 and its potential reverberations on the common law were subject to 
meticulous scrutiny,9 despite the fact that the CESL was merely a legislative proposal, 
ultimately withdrawn.10 
By contrast, the duty to act in good faith in Directive 86/653/EEC on the co-ordination of the 
laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents11 (the Directive) and 
its impact on agency at common law through the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 199312 (the Regulations) have not been studied in comparable depth.13 This is 
surprising, as the Directive was the first EU private law legislative instrument to introduce such 
a duty, and it did so in the ambit of commercial transactions rather than in the more intensely 
regulated consumer acquis.  
This paper endeavours to explore this scantly-charted area of the law. It will first analyse the 
obligation to act dutifully and in good faith in the Directive (the Obligation), assessing its 
scope, function and content. Subsequently, it will review the choices made by the UK 
legislature in implementing the Obligation and consider the manner in which this imported 
notion has been construed and applied by English, Scottish and Northern Irish courts, as well 
as commentators. Finally, it will appraise the impact that this duty to act in good faith has had 
on the pre-existing legal framework for agency at common law.  
2. Good faith in the Directive  
                                                 
6 See Roger Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract law’ in 
Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells, Good Faith in Contract: concept and context (Ashgate 
1999) 13-41. 
7 For a comprehensive bibliography, see Stephen Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Elgar 2013). 
8 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common European Sales Law 
(CESL) COM(2011) 635 final. 
9 See Simon Whittaker and Karl Riesenhuber, ‘Conception of Contract’ in Gerhard Dannemann and Stefan 
Vogenauer, The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and German Law (OUP 
2013) 120. 
10 For the withdrawal, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work Programme 
2015, COM(2014)910 final, Annex 2, 12. 
11 [1986] OJ L382/17. 
12 SI 1993/3053. 
13 The notable exceptions are Séverine Saintier and Jeremy Scholes, Commercial agents and the law (LLP 2005); 
Fergus Randolph and Jonathan Davey, The European law of commercial agency (2nd edn, Hart 2010); Peter Watts 
and Francis Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on agency, (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010); Susan Singleton, 
Commercial agency law and practice (3rd edn, Bloomsbury 2010); Howard Bennett, Principles of the law of 
agency (Hart 2013); Roderick Munday, The law of Agency (2nd edn, OUP 2013). 
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The duty to act dutifully and in good faith established in the Regulations (the Duty)14 cannot 
be fully understood without an in-depth investigation of its counterpart in the Directive, for 
two reasons. Firstly, the former implements the latter into UK law; accordingly, it cannot 
venture beneath the harmonisation threshold set out in the EU legislation. Secondly, UK courts 
are under an obligation to construe the Regulations “as far as possible, in the light of the 
wording and purpose of the [Directive]”,15 pursuant to the principle of consistent 
interpretation.16 Thus, the Directive is the source towards which they must turn when 
construing the Duty. 
The following analysis will commence by considering the provisions that establish the 
Obligation, then proceed to determine its scope, function, content and conclude by appraising 
the consequences arising in the event of a breach. The construction method adopted for this 
inquiry will combine a systematic analysis of the EU private law framework together with an 
investigation of the purpose, subject matter and wording of the Directive. This structured 
approach is consonant with the interpretation canons typically applied by the CJEU17 and 
carries notable advantages. It yields a more sophisticated construction of the Obligation, as it 
is informed by an understanding of good faith in EU private law. Moreover, this method 
overcomes the textual lacunae of the Directive and avoids the distortions caused by a strictly 
literal approach to the law. 
A. The provisions of the Directive 
The Directive only mentions “good faith” in Chapter II, “Rights and obligations”. Art18 3(1) 
states that a commercial agent must act “dutifully and in good faith” in “performing his 
activities”.19 This norm is followed by a few examples of the types of conduct that are required 
of commercial agents: “(a) make proper efforts to negotiate and […] conclude the transactions 
he is instructed to take care of; (b) communicate to his principal all the necessary information 
available to him; (c) comply with reasonable instructions given by his principal”. 
Similarly, Art 4(1) requires principals to act “dutifully and in good faith” in their “relations” 
with their commercial agents. In Arts 4(2)-(3), this is exemplified as providing the commercial 
agent with “the necessary documentation relating to the goods concerned”, sharing the 
“information necessary for the performance of the agency contract”, giving notice “within a 
reasonable period” when it is anticipated that the volume of future commercial transactions 
will be “significantly lower than that which the commercial agent could normally have 
                                                 
14 The expressions “the Obligation” and “the Duty” are used to refer to the requirement to act “dutifully and in 
good faith” in the Directive and Regulations respectively; this is purely a linguistic choice that serves to highlight 
that these norms exist on different legislative planes. 
15 Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8. 
Seminally see Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfallen (Case C-14/82) [1984] ECR I-1891, para 
26; in relation to the Directive see Centrosteel Srl v Adipol GmbH (Case C-456/98) [2000] ECR I-6007, paras 16-
17. 
16 Extensively, see Sasha Prechal, Directives in EC law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 180-210.  
17 On the interpretation of directives see Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and Remedies in English and 
Community Law (LLP 2001) 110; Prechal (n 16) 32, 76.  
18 Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations “Art” and “Arts” refer to provisions of the Directive.  
19 Art 3(1) also requires a commercial agent to “look after his principal’s interests”; this is a distinct obligation 
ulterior and complementary to the Obligation, falling outside the scope of this paper.  
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expected”, and apprising the commercial agent “within a reasonable period of his acceptance, 
refusal, and of any non-execution of a commercial transaction which the commercial agent has 
procured”.  
Art 5 concludes Chapter II, declaring that “the parties may not derogate from the provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4”.  
The text of Arts 3-4 raises the issue of whether the composite expression “to act dutifully and 
in good faith” gives rise to a single obligation, or rather two distinct obligations: one to act 
“dutifully” and another to act “in good faith”. It is submitted that the phrasing “dutifully and in 
good faith” is a hendiadys that generates a single obligation. This wording was chosen by the 
European legislature to indicate that the relevant concept is objective rather than subjective 
good faith. This construction is supported, firstly, by a comparative analysis of the various 
language versions of the Directive. The German text uses the wording “Treu und Glauben”, 
which famously identifies objective good faith. The French version reads “loyalment et de 
bonne foi”, echoing the locution “loyauté et bonne foi”, which traditionally connotes objective 
good faith. Similarly, the other Romance languages mirror the French version. Secondly, the 
CJEU has referred to a single “obligation”20 to act “dutifully and in good faith” in several 
decisions, as has the Commission in its Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on European Contract Law.21  
B. The scope of the Obligation 
Commercial agency relationships typically come into existence by way of agreement.22 
Therefore, a practical approach to charting the scope of the Obligation is to ascertain whether 
it extends to all phases of a contract.  
(i). Pre-contractual negotiations 
Arts 3-4 do not mention negotiations, and the CJEU has not yet been called upon to determine 
whether the Obligation extends to this contractual phase. Following the methodological 
approach outlined above, the first step to address this interpretation issue is to consider 
systematically culpa in contrahendo23 in EU private law.   
EU Treaties do not contain provisions that explicitly or implicitly mandate specific standards 
of conduct during pre-contractual negotiations. Equally, the CJEU has not yet recognised culpa 
in contrahendo as an EU general principle of law.24 
                                                 
20 Case C-3/04 Poseidon Chartering NV v Marianne Zeeship et al [2006] ECR I-2505, para 24; Case C-19/07 
Heirs of Paul Chevassus-Marche v Groupe Danone et al [2008] ECR I-161, para 22. 
21 COM(2001)398 final, 28. 
22 On whether a contract is a necessary requirement for a commercial agency relationship, see Andrea Tosato, 
‘The European dimension of the Commercial Agents Regulations’ [2014] LMCLQ 544, 562.  
23 This locution is used here as a synonym for “obligation to negotiate in good faith”.  
24 See Takis Tridimas, The general principles of EU law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 1-56; specifically on culpa in 
contrahendo, see Peter Rott, ‘Information obligations and withdrawal rights’ in Christian Twigg-Flessner (ed), 
The Cambridge companion to European Union Private law (CUP 2010) 187.  
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With regard to EU secondary sources of law, a small but significant number of private law 
legislative acts instruct parties to negotiate in good faith. In all of these cases, this requirement 
is enshrined in legislation that expressly sets out to govern the pre-contractual phase of the 
regulated transactions and is couched in unambiguous language.25 Notably, there are no 
secondary sources of law in which a general reference to good faith engenders pre-contractual 
obligations,26 and the CJEU has never advanced such an interpretation.  
EU soft law instruments yield further indications concerning the issue at hand. In the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),27 art II.–3:301 establishes that “a person is free to 
negotiate and not liable for failure to reach an agreement”; nevertheless, this rule is subject to 
the following qualification: “a person who is involved in negotiations has a duty to negotiate 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing”.28 Notably, art IV.E.–2:101 reduces the 
intensity of this obligation for “commercial agency, franchise and distributorship”, stating that 
parties need only provide each other with information “sufficient to allow them to decide on a 
reasonably informed basis whether to enter into a contract of the type on the terms under 
consideration” pursuant to “good commercial practice”.  
This brief overview reveals that culpa in contrahendo is not foreign to EU private law. 
Nevertheless, it equally highlights that this doctrine is only found in legislation that 
                                                 
25 See Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ 
L248/15 (Satellite Broadcasting Directive), art 12(1); Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and 
amending Council Directives 90/619/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC [2002] L271/16 (Financial Services Marketing 
Directive), Art 3(2); Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] OJ 
L211/94 (Gas Market Directive), art 33(3); Directive 2014/26/EU of 26 February 2014 on collective management 
of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the 
internal market [2014] L084/72 (Copyright Multi-Territorial Licencing Directive), art  16(1). See also the repealed 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers 
in respect of distance contracts [1997] OJ L144/19 (Distance Consumer Contracts Directive), art 4(2); repealed 
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity [1992] OJ L27/20, art  20(2). Notably, in the CESL, the pre-contractual 
disclosures regime established in art 23 fell short of a duty to negotiate in good faith; see Paula Giliker, 
‘Precontractual Good Faith and the Common European Sales Law: A compromise too far?’ [2013] ERPL 79. 
26 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29 
(Unfair Terms Directive), Art 3(1); Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC 
and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (Unfair Practices Directive) [2005] OJ L149/22, Art 2(h); 
Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions (Late Payment Directive) [2011] OJ L48/1, art 7(1)(a); Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1205/2011 of 22 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 adopting certain 
international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 [2011] OJ L306/16, Annex A.  
27 Christian von Bar and Eric Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (OUP 2010). 
28 The DCFR designates objective good faith with the hendiadys “good faith and fair dealing”, while subjective 
good faith is simply referred to as “good faith”, adopting the terminology of the Principles of European Contract 
Law (PECL).  
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unequivocally aims to regulate pre-contractual interactions and, when it does appear, it is 
clearly expressed in ad hoc provisions. 
Proceeding to the second part of the methodological approach previously described, focus turns 
to the purpose, subject matter and text of the Directive.  
The purpose of the Directive is twofold: to institute a harmonised core of rules regulating 
determinate elements of a particular type of agency relationship across Member States, and to 
introduce definite protections for commercial agents vis-à-vis their principals.29 Neither the 
recitals nor the enacting terms of the Directive indicate an intention to harmonise the rules 
governing negotiations for commercial agency contracts; furthermore, there is no suggestion 
that these pre-contractual interactions suffer from ontological or structural issues.  
Regarding subject matter, the Directive regulates critical aspects of the relationship between 
commercial agents and principals, and the legal consequences following its cessation. There 
are no rules that govern the parties’ conduct prior to the creation of the commercial agency. 
Furthermore, none of the examples of the duty to act in good faith in Arts 3-4 concern the pre-
contractual phase.  
The text of the Directive never mentions negotiations or interactions between the parties prior 
to the inception of the agency relationship. The recitals do mention “the conclusion” of 
commercial representation contracts; however, this fleeting reference cannot be construed as 
expressing an intention to regulate negotiations.  
It is thus submitted that the scope of the Obligation does not extend to pre-contractual 
interactions, for two reasons.30 First, the mere presence of one ambiguous textual element in 
Art 4(1) does not eclipse the absence of norms regulating negotiations in the Directive. 
Secondly, this legislative act lacks all the traits shared by those EU legislative instruments that 
require parties to negotiate in good faith.  
(ii). Contract performance  
The text of Arts 3(1)-4(1) leaves little doubt that the scope of the Obligation covers the 
performance of the agency. This is further supported by their collocation in the “rights and 
obligations” chapter of the Directive, and by the fact that all the examples in Arts 3(2)-4(2) 
concern performance. 
Nevertheless, these provisions are not entirely free of uncertainty. Art 3 requires a commercial 
agent to act pursuant to the Obligation “in performing his activities”, whereas Art 4 states that 
a principal must do the same “in his relations with the commercial agent”. This subtly-differing 
                                                 
29 See Case C-215/97 Bellone v Yokohama [1998] ECR-I 2191, para 13; Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton 
Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-9305, paras 20-21. 
30 This view is shared by Bettina Wendlandt, ‘EC Directive for Self Employed Commercial Agents and on Time-
Sharing – Apples, Oranges, and the Core of the Information Overload Problem’ in Geraint Howells, André Janssen 
and Reiner Schulze (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for Party Autonomy and 
Transactional Fairness (Ashgate 2005) 72.  
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wording calls into question whether the Obligation affects performance of the contract equally 
for both parties. 
It is submitted that the unconventional phraseology in Arts 3-4 is an infelicitous functional 
description of the respective undertakings of commercial agents and principals, rather than a 
positive differentiation between their rights and obligations. Support for this construction is 
found in Poseidon, in which the reasoning of the CJEU implies that the Obligation is reciprocal 
and identical for both parties.31 EU soft law instruments authored by the Commission have also 
explicitly affirmed the same view.32  
(iii). Remedies 
Arts 3-4 do not address whether the parties to a commercial agency relationship are subject to 
the Obligation when pursuing or defending remedies.  
Considering this issue first from a systematic perspective, the Treaties do not contain 
provisions that holistically address the role of good faith in relation to remedies. Equally, the 
CJEU has not explored whether a general principle of EU law exists that requires remedies to 
be pursued and defended in good faith. 
Among secondary sources of law, legislation that regulates procedural and remedial matters 
has been enacted in areas in which these interventions were deemed instrumental to the 
achievement of substantive harmonisation such as procurement law, competition law, 
intellectual property and free movement.33 Notably, none of these legislative interventions 
establish a good faith requirement in relation to the pursuit and defence of remedies.34 
EU soft law instruments seldom venture into procedures and remedies. Nevertheless, in the 
DCFR, art III.-1:103 expressly states that “a person has to act in accordance with good faith 
and fair dealing …. in exercising a right to performance, in pursuing or defending a remedy for 
non-performance, or in exercising a right to terminate an obligation or contractual 
relationship”.  
Thus, notwithstanding the DCFR, the picture that emerges from this analysis illustrates that the 
EU legislature has not yet felt compelled to introduce the notion of good faith in relation to 
remedies, in the private law acquis.  
Having acknowledged this premise, attention can turn to the Directive.  
From a teleological perspective, all the objectives pursued by this legislative act are substantive 
in nature. There is no evidence to suggest that their achievement requires the imposition of an 
obligation to act in good faith when pursuing or defending remedies; from the perspective of 
                                                 
31 Poseidon (n 20), para 24. 
32 See Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law (n 21) 28. 
33 For a survey see Christian Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law (Routledge 2013) 107-116. 
34 By contrast, CESL part IV-V contained detailed provisions that required parties pursuing and defending 
remedies to abide to the tenet of “good faith and fair dealing”.  
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the EU legislature the material issue is exclusively that Member State procedures and remedies 
ensure effective judicial protection of these aims.35  
With regard to subject matter, all provisions and recitals of the Directive concern the 
relationship between commercial agent and principal. There is nothing to indicate that the 
norms established in the Directive also extend to remedies, nor that the EU legislature sought 
to harmonise this aspect of the agency relationship. On the contrary, the only provision that 
tangentially touches these issues is Art 16, in which it is stated emphatically that the Directive 
does impinge on national rules governing immediate termination of agency contracts. 
In like vein, neither the recitals nor the enacting terms of the Directive contain textual 
references to remedies. 
Thus, it is submitted that there is no evidence to support the view that the scope of the 
Obligation extends to the remedial sphere.  
C. The legal function of the Obligation  
The Directive does not expressly articulate the legal function of the Obligation. This omission 
is problematic, as good faith has assumed markedly different guises over the course of the 
centuries and across jurisdictions, ranging from a judicial tool to advance natural law and 
pursue visceral justice to a statement of principle devoid of normative significance.36  
In light of this lineage, acquiring a systematic understanding of the functional profile of good 
faith in EU private law is particularly helpful in the accurate construction of the legal function 
of the Obligation.  
(i). The legal function of good faith in EU private law  
EU treaties do not contain express references to good faith that are relevant for a functional 
analysis in the private law sphere.37  
The CJEU has not recognised good faith as an EU general principle of law. Nevertheless, in 
the recent past, the Luxembourg court has referred to this notion as a “principle of civil law” 
and relied on it as a criterion for the interpretation of Art 6 of the Financial Services Marketing 
Directive.38 However, as the exact scope, nature, role, and legitimacy of these “principles of 
                                                 
35 See Anthony Arnull, ‘The principle of Effective Judicial protection in EU law, an unruly horse?’ [2011] ELR 
51. 
36 Classically Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des §§ 242 BGB (1956) who drew an analogy 
with Papinianus’ conception of the ius honorarium (or ius praetorium) as adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi 
iuris civilis. Recently, see Martijn Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, in Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn Hesselink, 
Ewoud Hondius, Chantal Mak and Edgar du Perron (eds), Towards a European Civil code (4th edn, Kluwer 2010) 
619. 
37 By contrast, in the public law sphere, the CJEU has long established that the principle of sincere co-operation 
established in TEU Art 3(4) (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13) imposes 
a duty to co-operate “in good faith” for the EU and the Member States; for a recent restatement see Case C-494/01 
Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, para 197. The Luxembourg Court has also recognised the duty to 
construe international instruments “in good faith” as an EU general principle of law; for a recent restatement see 
Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, para 40.  
38 Case C-489/07 Pia Messner v Firma Stefan Krüger [2009] ECR I-7315, para 26. 
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civil law” remains unsettled, little can be drawn from this decision with regard to the general 
function of good faith in EU private law.39  
Among EU secondary sources of law, good faith appears in a limited number of legislative 
acts.40 In the majority of cases,41 it serves as a behavioural requirement: it mandates that the 
parties must uphold an objective standard of conduct during specific stages of the regulated 
interactions. In two directives,42 good faith serves as a substantive requirement: it is one of the 
components of a broader fairness test that contract terms must substantively satisfy in order not 
to be held unenforceable. Here, good faith encroaches on the content of the stipulations agreed 
by the parties.43  
In the DCFR, good faith and fair dealing has multiple, distinct functions. Firstly, it is one of 
the criteria to be applied when interpreting the provisions of the DCFR itself.44 Secondly, it 
serves as a standard of conduct that parties must uphold during negotiations, throughout 
contract performance and when pursuing or defending remedies.45 Thirdly, it is one of the 
interpretation criteria that must be considered when construing contracts46 and implying 
terms.47 Fourthly, it is one aspect of the fairness test to which not individually negotiated terms 
are subject in business-to-consumer contracts.48 Crucially, the commentary highlights that “the 
function of a court is to use the duty of good faith and fair dealing to fill gaps where necessary 
but not to use the duty to correct or improve the contract by making it more fair than the parties 
themselves intended”.49 Thus, good faith and fair dealing does not override freedom of 
contract.   
Thus, good faith does not serve as an overarching tenet in EU private law; its application is 
confined to the remit of the instruments in which it appears.50 Moreover, leaving aside its 
nebulous role as a “principle of civil law”, this notion has a relative narrow functional profile 
in the legislation presently in force. It either imposes a mandatory standard of conduct on the 
                                                 
39 See Stephen Weatherill, ‘The principles of civil law as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’ [2010] 
ERCL 75-85; Arthur Hartkamp, ‘The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law’, (2011) 75 RabelsZ 241‐
259; Martijn Hesselink, ‘The General Principles of Civil Law: Their Nature, Roles and Legitimacy’ [2011] 
Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 2011-35.  
40 By contrast, examples of subjective good faith abound: eg Directive 2009/138/EC of 25 November 2009 on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) [2009] OJ L335/1, art 72(2); 
Directive 2009/65/EC of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L302/2213, 106(2).  
41 eg Unfair Practices Directive, art 2(h); Gas Market Directive, art 33(3).  
42 Unfair Terms Directive, art 3(1); Late Payment Directive, art 7(1)(a). 
43 By contrast, in the CESL, good faith and fair dealing had a broad functional profile (CESL arts 2(1), 59(h), 
68(1)(c), 83, 86, 170). 
44 See DCFR, art I.-1:102.  
45 DCFR, arts II.–3:301, III.-1:103. 
46 DCFR, art II.– 8:102. 
47 DCFR, art II.– 9:101. 
48 DCFR, art II.– 9:403. 
49 DCFR, art III.-1:103(2) Commentary D. Cf art II.-1:102(1) of the outline edition of the DCFR; see Horst 
Eidenmüller et al, ‘The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law—Policy Choices and 
Codification Problems’ (2008) 28 OJLS 659. 
50 Expressly acknowledged in the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, COM(2006) 744 final.  
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parties or serves as an element of a broad fairness test that governs the substance of certain 
types of contract terms. 
(ii). The functional profile of the Obligation in the Directive   
Returning to the Directive, the preceding overview indicates that a fertile starting point for an 
inquiry into the legal function of the Obligation would be to determine to whom it is addressed.  
Neither a teleological nor a textual analysis of the Directive suggests that the Obligation is 
directed to courts. There are no provisions establishing that the Directive must be interpreted 
pursuant to good faith; the canons of interpretation generally relevant for EU secondary 
legislative acts apply unaltered.51 Likewise, there are no rules requiring that the terms of 
commercial agency agreements must be construed in good faith; national canons and 
conventions will not be supplanted. It follows that the Obligation does not have an 
interpretative function. 
Similarly, courts are not required to assess whether contract terms are consistent with the 
Obligation, and the Directive does not subject the validity of the stipulations of commercial 
agency agreements to a broad fairness test. Accordingly, the Obligation does not serve as a 
substantive requirement. 
Arts 3-4 are unequivocally addressed to commercial agents and principals. These provisions 
postulate that the parties must uphold a specific standard of conduct throughout the 
performance of the commercial agency and provide examples of the required behaviour. This 
is fortified by Art 5, which bestows mandatory character to Arts 3-4, by dictating that the parties 
cannot derogate from these provisions.  
Based on the elements adduced from EU private law and the Directive, it is submitted that the 
Obligation serves as a mandatory behavioural requirement, characterised by a proscriptive and 
a prescriptive dimension. 
The proscriptive dimension prohibits principals and commercial agents from acting in a manner 
contrary to good faith when performing the agency agreement; consequently, it also debars 
parties from exercising their rights and performing their obligations in a manner inconsistent 
with this prescribed standard of conduct. Though it is not expressly enunciated in the form of 
a prohibition to act in bad faith, this functional trait can be inferred a contrario from the positive 
statement that parties must act in good faith in Arts 3-4.  
The prescriptive dimension awards rights and imposes obligations on principals and 
commercial agents alike, supplementing those stipulated in their agreement; accordingly, the 
Obligation acts as a source of implied terms. This functional trait can be deduced from Arts 
                                                 
51 In this respect, the impact of good faith as a “principle of civil law” could be significant; see n 38.  
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3(2), 4(2)-4(3), as these provisions offer a non-exhaustive list of the types of conduct that 
commercial agents and principals are required to perform under the Obligation.52  
D. The content of the Obligation 
Scope and function are essential elements towards a complete understanding of the Obligation. 
Nevertheless, they do not assist in addressing the fundamental question: what is the standard 
of conduct demanded by the obligation to act in good faith established in the Directive? To 
answer this question it is necessary to determine the content of the Obligation.  
The Directive does not impart comprehensive guidance on this matter, nor yet has the CJEU.53 
Following the methodological approach adopted throughout this paper, it is submitted that this 
construction issue must be addressed by combining general indications deduced from the EU 
legal framework with the specific ones extrapolated from the Directive.  
(i). The content of good faith in EU private law 
EU Treaties do not provide general indications concerning the content of good faith in EU 
private law. Equally, though the CJEU has referred to good faith in multiple decisions, it has 
never ventured into an exhaustive discussion of the substance of this concept.  
EU secondary sources of law that do mention good faith neglect to provide an intensional 
definition of this notion. Nevertheless, the following legislative acts offer guidelines and 
indications for its application in relation to their regulated subject matter.  
The recitals of the Unfair Terms Directive note that conformity of contractual provisions with 
good faith must be assessed with particular regard to the idiosyncrasies of the transaction at 
hand and “the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties”.54 This standard is satisfied 
when suppliers act “fairly and equitably”, and take into account the other party’s legitimate 
interests.55 In interpreting this directive, the CJEU has held that it is for national courts to decide 
whether a concrete term satisfies the requirement of good faith,56 yet has remarked that this 
appraisal must be conducted pursuant to the criteria detailed in the recitals.57  
In like vein, the Late Payment Directive qualifies “any gross deviation from good commercial 
practice, contrary to good faith and fair dealing” as a relevant “circumstance” in appraising 
whether a contract term is grossly unfair and thus unenforceable.58 In relation to “good faith 
                                                 
52 This view is shared by Martin Franzen, Privatrechtsangleichung durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft (De 
Gruyter 1999) 544-548; Oliver Remien, ‘Die Vorlagepflicht bei Auslegung unbestimmter Rechtsbegriffe’ (2002) 
66 RabelsZ 503, 518, 524.  
53 The CJEU briefly considered the Obligation in Case C-203/09 Volvo [2010] ECR-10721, para 34; ibid see 
Opinion of AG Bot, paras 39-45; see also Poseidon (n 20) para 24.   
54 Unfair Terms Directive, recitals 16-17.  
55 ibid.  
56 Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter et Ulrike 
Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403. 
57 C‐415/11, Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) [2013] 1 CMLR 5, 
para 69. 
58 Late Payment Directive, art 7(1)(a). 
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and fair dealing”, the recitals expressly refer to the DCFR and provide examples of unfair 
stipulations.59 
In the Unfair Practices Directive, good faith is a constituent element of the “professional 
diligence” standard that professionals must uphold during all regulated interactions with 
consumers. The definition of “professional diligence” ties the notion of good faith to conduct 
consistent with the commercial standards of the “trader’s field of activity”.60 
Other legislative acts do not provide equally explicit guidance, yet tacitly offer indications for 
the application of good faith in their respective ambits. 
In the Financial Services Marketing Directive, information provided to consumers by financial 
service suppliers must be communicated with due regard for the principle of good faith.61 
Neither the recitals nor provisions elucidate the content of this standard of conduct, but the 
underlying regulatory aim is to prevent the exploitation of informational asynchronies. 
Both the Gas Market Directive and the Copyright Multi-Territorial Licencing Directive require 
pre-contractual negotiations to be conducted in good faith.62 The recitals and enacting terms do 
not provide details, but the imposition of this standard of conduct appears to stem from policy 
concerns germane to this sector; the aim is to ensure that unregulated pre-contractual 
interactions do not eventuate in abusive exploitation of asymmetrical bargaining positions, 
undermining the pursued market liberalisation.  
EU soft law bestows additional elucidations. The Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis63 expressly remarks that there is no general duty to act in good faith in EU private law 
or even in the more limited consumer acquis. Nevertheless, when hypothesising on the 
introduction of such a tenet, the Commission suggested that if it were to exist, it ought to 
include the idea of paying “due regard to the interests of the other party, considering the specific 
situation of certain consumers”.64  
In the DCFR, “good faith and fair dealing” is presented as an overarching tenet,65 defined as 
“a standard of conduct characterised by honesty, openness and consideration for the interests 
of the other party to the transaction or relationship in question”.66 The commentary states that 
“honesty” carries its “normal meaning”, to be deduced in contrast to dishonesty, and that 
“openness” denotes transparency in a person’s conduct.67 With regard to “consideration for the 
interests of the other party”, malicious behaviour is always against good faith, but otherwise 
“only a basic level of consideration” is required, without having to yield to the interests of the 
                                                 
59 Late Payment Directive, recital 28. 
60 Unfair Practices Directive, art 2(h). 
61 Financial Services Marketing Directive, art 3(2). 
62 Gas Market Directive, art 33(3); Copyright Multi-Territorial Licencing Directive, Recital 31, art 16(1). 
63 See n 50. 
64 ibid 17. 
65 DCFR, art 0.-301. 
66 DCFR, art I.-1:103. A similar definition was present in the CESL (RegCESL, art 2(b)). 
67 DCFR, art I.-1:103, Comment A.  
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other party peremptorily.68 The actual degree of consideration to be exhibited will depend on 
the circumstances and nature of the agreement, possibly fading into the background in detailed 
commercial contracts.69 The commentary further remarks that “what the parties agreed in the 
contract” is paramount in determining whether a particular behaviour is in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing.70 Interestingly, in the “Specific Contracts” Book, under the 
common provisions for commercial agency, franchise and distributorship contracts, arts IV.E.-
2:201 and IV.E.-2:202 articulate the duty of “good faith and fair dealing” by establishing 
specific obligations of “co-operation” and “information during performance” respectively.71  
It would be an untenable proposition to argue that these sources of law provide sufficient 
elements to infer systematically a robust and comprehensive construction of good faith in EU 
private law.72 Nevertheless, there are several distinguishing features that emerge consistently. 
Firstly, good faith has an autonomous meaning that must be applied consistently across 
Member States, pursuant to the principle of uniform application of EU law.73 This can be 
deduced from the fact that none of the legislative acts featuring this notion refer to Member 
State laws for its definition.  
Secondly, good faith is a general clause. It is characterised by a broad and highly abstract 
nucleus that must be “concretised”74 in relation to the apposite context of application. There 
are not multiple, distinct conceptions of good faith, each with different content depending on 
the ambit in which it appears.75  
Thirdly, as good faith is a general clause it cannot easily be reduced to an exhaustive, positive 
definition. Nevertheless, over the past decade, honesty, openness and regard for the interest of 
the other party have progressively emerged as its primary ingredients in EU soft law 
instruments76 and this conceptualisation has spilled over to legislative acts.77  
                                                 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 DCFR, art III.-1:103(2) Comment D. 
71 DCFR, art IV.E.-2:201, Comment A; art IV.E.-2:202, Comment B.  
72 cf Reich (n 2) 189-213.  
73 Seminally, Case C-327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, para 11; in EU private law, see Whittaker and Riesenhuber 
(n 9) 111-112. 
74 Throughout this paper, the word “concretisation” is used to signify the process by virtue of which the abstract 
nucleus of good faith is reduced to guidelines and precepts that are then applied by courts to the specific facts of 
the case at hand. The function of concretisation is to rationalise and objectivise good faith, yet without depriving 
it of its open norm character. In some jurisdictions, concretisation has been carried out by way of legislation. In 
others, it has been the fruit of legal scholarship, either by way of inductive reasoning based on court decisions or 
through deductive theoretical abstractions. Extensively on “concretisation” see Hesselink (n 36) 623-624; Peter 
Schlechtriem, ‘The Functions of General Clauses, Exemplified by regarding Germanic Laws and Dutch Law’, in 
Grundmann and Mazeaud (n 4). 
75 This view is shared by Stefan Grundmann, ‘The General Clause or Standard in EC contract law’ in Grundmann 
and Mazeaud (n 4) 141; see also Case C‐453/10, Pereničová v SOS financ spol sro [2012] 2 CMLR 28 opinion of 
AG Trstenjak; C-435/11, CHS Tour Services GmbH v Team4 Travel GmbH [2001] ECR, opinion of AG Wahl, 
para 29.  
76 eg DCFR and previously PECL. 
77 eg the express references to the DCFR in the Late Payment Directive and in the CESL. 
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Fourthly, the legislation in which good faith is included expressly or impliedly provides 
guidelines for its concretisation.78 Though these criteria are diverse, there are several recurring, 
underlying themes79 such as avoidance of market failures,80 prevention of the abuse of 
asymmetries,81 consideration for the intentions of the parties as objectively attested in their 
agreement,82 and attention to the relevant commercial context.83  
It is submitted that the Obligation bears all these features and thus requires parties to act with 
honesty, openness and regard for the interests of the other party to the transaction. Crucially, 
the next step is to identify the criteria for the concretisation of this standard of conduct, in the 
context of the commercial agency. 
(ii). The concretisation of good faith in commercial agency 
The Directive does not offer explicit textual indications conducive to the concretisation of the 
Obligation. Nevertheless, Arts 3(2), 4(2) provide examples of what is expected of the parties 
to satisfy the mandated standard of conduct. Though these behaviours concern diverse aspects 
of the agency relationship, the underlying theme is positive collaboration between commercial 
agents and principals towards the full realisation of their agreement. 
Looking beyond the text of the provisions, further indications can be deduced from the aims 
and subject matter of the Directive.  
With regard to the former, as previously observed, one stated aim of the Directive is to 
introduce specific protections for commercial agents at certain junctures of the agency 
relationship. This objective reflects the attention of the EU legislature to market failures 
engendered by imbalanced contractual relationships, even outside the consumer acquis.84  
With regard to subject matter, the Directive sets out a broad definition of commercial agency. 
The specificities of the parties involved may vary significantly. The commercial agent may be 
an individual trader and the principal a large corporation; conversely, the principal may be an 
entrepreneur entirely dependent on its commercial agent for market penetration; still 
differently, the parties may be evenly matched. Equally, the nature of the agency stipulated by 
the parties is subject to a wide margin of variation; it can range from intensely relational and 
open-ended, to an arm’s length agreement of limited duration and finite objectives.  
Based on the express and implied elements extrapolated from the Directive, it is submitted that 
it is possible to delineate two normative precepts that assist in concretising the standard of 
                                                 
78 eg Unfair Terms Directive, Unfair Practices Directive, Late Payment Directive. 
79 cf David Campbell and Hugh Collins, Discovering the implicit dimensions of the contract, in David Campbell, 
Hugh Collins, John Wightman, Implicit dimensions of contract (Hart 2003) 25-51.  
80 eg Gas Market Directive, Copyright Multi-Territorial Licencing Directive.  
81 eg Unfair Terms Directive, Unfair Practices Directive and Late Payment Directive.  
82 eg Unfair Terms Directive, the CESL and the DCFR. 
83 eg Unfair Practices Directive, Late Payment Directive. 
84 See Vincenzo Roppo, ‘From Consumer Contracts to Asymmetric Contracts: a Trend in European Contract 
Law?’ [2009] ERCL 301. 
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conduct of honesty, openness and regard for the interests of the other party mandated by the 
Obligation.  
Firstly, expressing honesty and openness, commercial agents and principals must mutually co-
operate in the performance of their agreement. Conduct in good faith requires that each party 
proactively take action to assist the other in the realisation of their bargain, as opposed to mere 
abstention from obstructive behaviour. However, whether a party has acted in good faith must 
not be determined by reference to a moral or metaphysical notion of co-operation; this 
assessment must be based on an objective appraisal of the actual commercial agency 
relationship. Accordingly, the intensity of the required co-operation will vary, depending on 
the terms of the contract and the pertinent commercial practices. 
Secondly, commercial agents and principals must not exploit asymmetries in their agency 
relationship in such a manner that frustrates the legitimate expectations of the other party. In 
this respect, whether a conduct is in breach of the Obligation must be appraised holistically, 
considering all aspects of the relationship; material facts will include the contractual and 
commercial leverage of each party, their objective intentions as enshrined in the contract, and 
the business practices of the sector in question. Nevertheless, the starting axiom of this 
investigation must be that these are commercial relationships85 in which professionals are 
expected to be self-reliant and must be free to pursue their self-interest. Critically, this will not 
be an estimation aimed at achieving ontological fairness, a just bargain or equilibrium between 
the giving and receiving of commercial agents and principals.86  
E. The consequences of breach of the Obligation 
The Directive does not contain provisions that address the consequences flowing from a breach 
of the Obligation. This is not an oversight on the part of the EU legislature, but rather a choice 
inspired by the EU law tenets of proportionality and subsidiarity.87 Thus, pursuant to the 
principle of procedural autonomy,88 Member States can apply their domestic procedural and 
remedial norms, provided that they satisfy the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness 
demanded by the CJEU.89 
3. Good faith in the Regulations  
The preceding exploration of the Obligation in the Directive provides the necessary frame of 
reference to analyse and construe the Duty in the Regulations.  
                                                 
85 For relationships involving consumers, see Chris Willet ‘General clauses and the competing ethics of European 
consumer law in the UK’ (2012) 71 CLJ 412. 
86 Steven Burton’s “foregone opportunities” approach theory offers here an appealing model. Steven Burton, 
‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’, (1980) 93 Harvard LR 372. 
87 Ex multis Tridimas (n 24) 136-193. 
88 Seminally, Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, 1997. Ex multis, Walter 
Van Gerven ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ 37 CMLRev 501.    
89 Ex multis, Michael Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation (Hart 2004).  
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The implementation of the Directive into UK law will be assessed first, to acquire an 
understanding of how the surrounding legal environment influenced this process and its 
outcomes. Thereafter, mirroring the structure of the first part of this paper, the text of the 
relevant sections of the Regulations will be reviewed, followed by the scope, function and 
content of the Duty. 
A. The implementation of the Directive in UK law 
The EU Commission proposal to harmonise the law of commercial agents across Member 
States was not well received in the UK.90  
Once the Directive was enacted, its implementation proved to be a lengthy and tortuous process 
in Westminster. Ultimately, the UK legislature91 elected to transpose the words of the Directive 
almost verbatim into the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (SI 
1993/3053), adopting the “copy-out” technique.92  
This drafting choice embodied a strong desire not to alter the pre-existing common law agency 
rules beyond what was strictly required by EU law, while avoiding Francovich liability due to 
an imperfect implementation.93 Nevertheless, the “copy-out” technique fettered the 
Regulations with two notable flaws. Firstly, as EU legal terminology is both autonomous and 
distinct from that of Member States, the verbatim transposition of the Directive yielded a 
statutory instrument bearing terms that are either unknown or have a different meaning at 
common law. Secondly, the Regulations lack co-ordination with the pre-existing UK legal 
framework, as they merely reproduce the norms of the Directive, which detail only the speciﬁc 
harmonisation objectives to be realised.94 
B. The provisions of the Regulations 
Reflecting the “copy-out” method of implementation, Regs95 3, 4 and 5(1) reproduce the 
Directive almost verbatim.  
                                                 
90 See the Law Commission, Law of Contract Report on the Proposed EEC Directive on The Law Relating to 
Commercial Agents (Law COM No 84), 48 suggesting that the proposed directive “offended against basic 
principles of the English law of agency”. See also the House of Lords Select Committee Fifty-First Report, 
Wednesday 27 July 1977, paras 2, 11 questioning the desirability of EU intervention in this area of private law 
and the quality of the drafting. 
91 The Regulations were prepared by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under statutory powers 
conferred in the European Communities Act 1972 s 2(2), and were presented by the Secretary of State to 
Parliament for approval. On the different drafts of the Regulations, see Randolph and Davey (n 13) 13-24. 
92 For a critical analysis see Prechal (n 16) 32, 76; Lynn Ramsey, ‘The Copy Out Technique: More of a ‘Cop out’ 
than a solution?’ [1996] SLR 218, 219-221. 
93 See Randolph and Davey (n 13) 22-24; The Department of Trade and Industry, Review of the Implementation 
and Enforcement of EC Law in the UK, (1993) 42-3. 
94 See Saintier and Scholes (n 13) 17.  
95 Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations “Reg” and “Regs” refer to provisions of the Regulations. 
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The dominant view among authorities96 and commentators97 is that the requirement for 
commercial agents and principals to act “dutifully and in good faith” in Regs 3-4 gives rise to 
a single obligation.98  
Nevertheless, in Simpson v Grant & Bowman Limited,99 HHJ Alton described the duty to act 
“in good faith” and that to act “dutifully” as distinct “elements” of Reg 4.100 Similarly, in 
Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Co Ltd,101 Cranston J held that “the concept in 
regulation 3 of a commercial agent ‘acting dutifully’ has not received the same attention as has 
that of good faith. In my view it connotes the obligation to act loyally. For present purposes 
both sides accept that the duty of loyalty reflects the fiduciary duty of an agent at common law 
… Strictly speaking, to act dutifully is a concept of European law, with an autonomous 
meaning, albeit one which may draw on national analogies”.102 
Respectfully, this alternative view is unconvincing, as it is incompatible with the Directive. It 
is the product of a textual and compartmentalised construction of the Regulations that 
disregards their European dimension and the principle of consistent interpretation.103  
C. The scope of the Duty 
Courts have unanimously recognised that commercial agents and principals are subject to the 
Duty during the performance of the commercial agency.104 By contrast, there are no authorities 
that deal with pre-contractual negotiations105 and remedies. The absence of case law, however, 
has not deterred commentators from sharing their views on these issues.  
Saintier and Scholes submit that the reference to principals’ “relations” with their commercial 
agents in Reg 4(1) implies that the scope of their duty to act in good faith includes pre-
contractual negotiations.106 Moreover, they suggest that this construction is consonant with the 
purpose of the Regulations, as it prevents “the principal from taking advantage of the 
commercial agent rather like the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive and … rather 
like the duty of disclosure placed on the insured in insurance law in English law”.107 From this 
basis, they subsequently conclude that commercial agents are bound by an identical duty to 
                                                 
96 See Page v Combined Shipping and Trading Co Ltd [1996] CLC. 1952; Cooper v Pure Fishing Ltd 22 July 
2003 Manchester District Registry Mercantile Court; Npower Direct Ltd v South of Scotland Power Ltd [2005] 
EWHC 2123; Cureton v Mark Insulations Ltd [2006] EWHC 2279 (QB), ECL Rep 2006, 6(4), 24; Vick v Vogles-
Gapes Ltd [2006] EWHC 1665 (QB), (2006) 150 SJLB 917; Scottish Power Energy Retail Ltd v Taskforce 
Contracts Ltd [2008] CSOH 110, 2009 SCLR 137; Anderson v Crocs Europe BV [2011] EWHC 3386 (QB); 
97 See Saintier and Scholes (n 13) 76; Randolph and Davey (n 13) 56; Bennett (n 13) 113. 
98 See 2.1. 
99 [2006] EuLR 933. 
100 ibid [15]. 
101 [2011] EWHC 2482 (QB); [2012] Bus LR 571 (QBD). 
102 ibid [41]. See Andrew McGee, ‘Relations between a commercial agent and his principal’ [2013] JBL 541. 
103 See 2A. 
104 eg Page (n 96); Npower (n 96); Rossetti (n 101). 
105 cf Parks v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1999] 1 CMLR 455 (Ch D) in which it was not discussed whether a 
misrepresentation at common law was also a breach of Reg 4.  
106 Saintier and Scholes (n 13) 100-101. 
107 ibid. 
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negotiate in good faith, because of the “reciprocity and symmetry”108 that characterise all 
parties’ obligations in the Regulations.   
Respectfully, this thesis is unconvincing.  
Firstly, from a methodological standpoint, Saintier and Scholes’ arguments are primarily 
textual and largely reliant on analogies with English law; the Directive is only marginally 
considered. This approach is flawed, as such disregard for the principle of consistent 
interpretation ultimately undermines the uniform application of EU law.  
Secondly, with regard to the proposed duty for principals to negotiate in good faith, Saintier 
and Scholes do not provide adequate substantiation to support their broad construction of the 
word “relations” in Reg 4(1), beyond the basic observation that this term possesses a wide 
semantic connotation.109  
Thirdly, the proffered analogy between the position of principals under the Regulations and 
that of traders under the Unfair Terms Directive is unsustainable. Consumers are awarded 
special protections when negotiating with traders to compensate for their intrinsically weaker 
bargaining position. Though the Regulations introduce specific safeguards for commercial 
agents vis-à-vis their principals, they do not purport that their position is analogous to that of 
consumers; by definition, commercial agents are self-employed professionals dealing with 
other professionals and their relative bargaining power will vary depending on the 
circumstances.  
Fourthly, the advocated analogy between the Regulations and English insurance law is 
problematic. As a preliminary remark, it must be noted that the Insurance Act 2015 has almost 
entirely effaced the significance of good faith from pre-contractual negotiations of insurance 
contracts, negating any possible analogy with the Duty for present purposes.110 However, even 
disregarding this reform, good faith previously required that the insured party disclose all 
information material to the judgement of the insurer during negotiations. This was a departure 
from the caveat emptor principle otherwise applicable to commercial transactions at common 
law, traditionally justified by the nature of insurance as an arm’s length relationship, uniquely 
dependant on information.111 The rationale was that the insured has better knowledge of “the 
risks in respect of which the contract is to be made—whereas the insurer is likely to be unaware 
of the extent of those risks”.112 Commercial agency differs profoundly from insurance. Most 
pertinently, there is no congenital informational asymmetry between principals and 
                                                 
108 ibid. 
109 Notably, the English, Portuguese, Spanish and Romanian versions of the Directive uses the term “relations” or 
equivalent wording. By contrast, the French and Italian versions contain the word “rapports” and “rapporti” in 
Art 4(1), as opposed to the broader “relations” and “relazioni” used in Arts 1, 17(3). Differently, in Art 4(1), the 
German version simply states that the principal must behave towards the agent pursuant to the commandments of 
“Treu und Glauben”. 
110 Insurance Act 2015 ss 3, 14-18. See Guy Blackwood, ‘The pre-contractual duty of (utmost) god faith: the 
past and the future’ [2014] LMCLQ 311. 
111 See Howard Bennett, ‘Mapping the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance contract law’ [1999] LMCLQ 
165. 
112 Francis Rose, ‘Informational Asymmetry and the Myth of Good Faith: Back to Basis’ [2007] LMCLQ 181. 
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commercials agents to warrant a departure from the caveat emptor orthodox negotiating 
position. 
Fifthly, specifically with regard to commercial agents, Saintier and Scholes’ thesis is built on 
the axiom that principals are subject to the Duty throughout negotiations; if, as argued above, 
this hypothesis is incorrect, their whole construction crumbles.  
It is submitted that the scope of application of the Duty mirrors that of the Obligation and does 
not extend to pre-contractual negotiations.113 This is supported by the observation that the UK 
legislature did not intend to realise an expansive implementation of the Directive. Furthermore, 
in light of the historical disinclination of the common law towards culpa in contrahendo,114 
had there been an intention to introduce a duty to negotiate in good faith, it likely would have 
emerged from the travaux preparatoires of the Regulations and the normative text would have 
been worded in an unambiguous manner.  
With regard to remedies, Saintier and Scholes claim that the arguments they submit to theorise 
a doctrine of culpa in contrahendo in the Regulations also support the view that parties are 
“bound by their duties of good faith when terminating the relationship and also in dealing with 
the consequences of termination (e.g. as to finalising the financial settlement between them and 
as to the operation of any post-termination restrictive covenant as referred to in Regulation 
20)”.115  
Respectfully, this thesis is not compelling. 
Firstly, the methodological and substantive criticisms previously levelled at the arguments 
offered in support of the inclusion of negotiations within the scope of Duty are equally valid in 
this context. 
Secondly, Saintier and Scholes use the word “termination” loosely to indicate the coming to an 
end of the commercial agency relationship,116 espousing the semantics of the Regulations.117 
However, used so broadly,118 the word “termination” covers a panoply of situations, in which 
the parties are subject to markedly different rules.119 Hence, the proposition that commercial 
agents and principals are subject to the duty of good faith “when terminating the relationship” 
is dogmatically deficient, as it indiscriminately commingles a multitude of situations that are 
not homogenous at law.  
                                                 
113 This view is shared by Bennett (n 13) 114. 
114 See Paula Giliker, Pre-Contractual Liability in English and French Law (Kluwer 2002). 
115 Saintier and Scholes (n 13) 101. 
116 This is evidenced by their reference to Reg 20. 
117 See Regs 17-18; the word “termination” is copied-out from the Directive verbatim.  
118 As opposed to using the word “termination” strictly to refer to the remedial, prospective dissolution of the 
contract; on this issue see Light v Ty Europe Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1238; [2003] EuLR 858; Pure Fishing (n 96) 
[15]-[18]. 
119 eg discharge by agreement, resolution by effluxion of time, frustration, as well as acceptance of a repudiatory 
breach. 
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Thirdly, Saintier and Scholes’ thesis is incomplete as it only considers termination, neglecting 
to discuss whether the scope of the Duty also extends to other remedies. 
Thus it is submitted that the scope of the Duty does not extend to remedies. This is supported 
by the observations that the Directive does not intend to harmonise the remedial framework 
surrounding commercial agency, and that the Regulations in no way suggest that the UK 
legislature intended to amend the common law in this area.  
D. The function of the Duty 
The Regulations do not provide express guidance concerning the legal function of the Duty, 
mirroring the text of the Directive.  
Consequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that English and Scottish judges have dealt cautiously 
with this issue. Nevertheless, it is possible to construe inductively the functional profile 
attributed to the Duty by reviewing the case law.  
Firstly, authorities have consistently ruled that Regs 3-4 forbid commercial agents and 
principals from adopting behaviour that falls short of the mandated standard of conduct.  
In the High Court case of Cureton v Mark Insulations Ltd, Bean J held that a commercial agent 
who marketed his own goods alongside and in competition with those of the principal was in 
breach of Reg 3.120 In similar vein, in Anderson v Crocs Europe BV, Sir Raymond Jack posited 
that “it is obvious that an agent should not go about disparaging the way his principal runs his 
business. If he does so, he will be in breach of his regulation 3 duty”.121 
Secondly, several English and Scottish decisions have recognised that Regs 3-4 debar 
principals and commercial agents from exercising their contractual rights in a manner that is 
irreconcilable with the standard of conduct mandated by the Duty. 
This functional trait of the Duty was first implicitly acknowledged in Page v Combined 
Shipping and Trading Co Ltd122 In this case, a commercial agent appealed a decision denying 
him a Mareva injunction against his principal. Both Staughton123 and Millett124 LJJ accepted 
that a principal that contractually had “absolute discretion” to vary the number of transactions 
handled by its commercial agent would be in breach of Reg 4(1) if it exercised this right to 
reduce business volume to zero. 
This position was then explicitly articulated in two subsequent decisions. In Cooper v Pure 
Fishing Ltd, HHJ Kershaw QC held that a principal exercising its contractual rights to 
“engineer” a situation that would engender a conflict of interests for its commercial agents was 
                                                 
120 Cureton (n 96) [15]-[27]. In the lower courts, see Edwards v International Connection (UK) Ltd Central 
London County Court Judgment 25 November 2005, in which HHJ Knight interestingly accepted the hypothesis 
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in breach of the Duty.125 Similarly, in Scottish Power Energy Retail Ltd v Taskforce Contracts 
Ltd, Lord Menzies had to adjudicate, inter alia,126 whether a principal who had caused a 70% 
contraction in his agent’s commission by reducing the scope of his authority has breached Reg 
4. Having reviewed the terms of the agency agreement, his Lordship concluded that the 
principal had exercised his contractual rights in a manner consistent with the Duty.127 
Nevertheless, the authorities do not speak in unison on this point. In Vick v Vogles-Gapes Ltd, 
HHJ Seymour QC voiced doubts that “it was necessary to have regard to the obligation … to 
act dutifully and in good faith” when exercising contractual rights stipulated in the agency 
agreement.128 Citing Lord Wilberforce in Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey 
Construction UK Ltd,129 he argued that a party’s reliance on an express contract term, “even 
mistakenly and wrongly”, could never be treated as a breach of contract under English law, let 
alone as repudiatory intention to abandon or refuse performance.  
Respectfully, HHJ Seymour’s QC reasoning is flawed. Setting aside the law in Woodar,130 his 
reasoning is entirely based on the assumption that the Duty can be construed and moulded on 
the basis of English contract law doctrines. On the contrary, recourse to domestic legal 
doctrines is an avenue precluded to Member State courts when interpreting national legislation 
that implements EU law; UK courts are under an obligation to construe the Regulation in light 
of the wording and purpose of the Directive.131 Accordingly, this would have required a 
construction of the Duty informed by an inquiry into the legal function of the Obligation; 
alternatively, a question of interpretation could have been referred to the CJEU.  
Thirdly, English courts have held that Regs 3-4 can imply terms into commercial agency 
agreements.  
In Npower Direct Ltd v South of Scotland Power Limited, Cresswell J held that the Duty could 
not broaden the substance of an obligation as contractually stipulated by the parties.132 
Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, he accepted the submission that the Duty could imply 
terms into the agreement concluded by the parties.133 
                                                 
125 Pure Fishing (n 96) [36]-[37]. On Appeal, Tuckey LJ affirmed the reasoning of HHJ Kershaw QC, Cooper, 
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Similarly, in Simpson v Grant & Bowman Limited, HHJ Alton expressly accepted that Reg 4 
can act as a source of implied obligations in the agreement beyond those expressly agreed by 
the parties.134 
It is thus submitted that this body of case law evidences that English and Scottish courts have 
construed the Duty as establishing a behavioural requirement, mandating a standard of conduct 
which commercial agents and principals must uphold throughout performance of the agency. 
Despite the lack of exhaustive judicial reasoning and a principled analysis, this stance is 
welcome, as it accurately implements the functional profile of the Obligation into the UK legal 
order. 
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that the Duty has a broader functional footprint, also 
serving as a substantive requirement that contractual stipulations must satisfy to be 
enforceable.135  
At present, there are no authorities that squarely address this issue, as no attempt has yet been 
made to have a contractual term set aside on the grounds that it is irreconcilable with Regs 3-
4.  
The following decisions, however, appear implicitly to rule out this construction. In Cureton, 
Bean J concluded that the agent’s conduct was in breach of the Duty, absent a stipulation that 
countenanced such behaviour.136 Similarly, in both Simpson and Scottish Power, the content of 
the terms of the commercial agency agreement was paramount in determining whether the 
specific conduct of the principal breached Reg 4.137 An even clearer statement in this direction 
is found in Rossetti. Here, Cranston J explicitly stated that the obligations in Regs 3-4 “are non 
derogable, but their content is not invariable and will be moulded by the contractual context”.138 
This reasoning implies that it is the manner in which the parties perform contract terms that 
must be consonant with the Duty, not the substance of the stipulations. 
The sole dissenting voice is that of Cresswell J, in Npower. In an obiter dictum he posited that 
“if and to the extent it is to be suggested that the express terms were contrary to the 
requirements to act dutifully and in good faith, the relevant contract terms must be 
identified”.139 Though not perspicuous, this statement could be interpreted as implying that 
stipulations the content of which is irreconcilable with the Duty are ineffective. 
It is submitted that the Duty does not serve as a substantive requirement.140 It was previously 
argued that the Obligation only serves as a behavioural requirement in the Directive. 
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Accordingly, treating the Duty as substantive requirement relies on the tenuous assumption 
that the UK legislature intended to carry out an expansive implementation of the Directive. 
Moreover, such a construction would result in a compression of party autonomy that, while not 
uncommon in business-to-consumer transactions,141 would be atypical for commercial 
relationships. This would be a particularly surprising development in the UK, given the 
historical prominence attributed to freedom of contract. 
E. The content of the Duty 
The Regulations do not provide indications elucidating the content of the Duty beyond those 
present in the Directive. 
Against this legislative backdrop, English and Scottish courts have often eschewed the perilous 
task of defining the content of the Duty, preferring to simply rule whether a particular conduct 
breaches Regs 3-4.142  
This approach is neither incorrect nor does it necessarily lead to flawed decisions; nevertheless, 
it does result in an inconvenient under-conceptualisation of doctrine and a piecemeal legal 
framework that are unlikely to yield consistent case law. Furthermore, lack of actionable 
guidance concerning the content of the Duty deprives the parties of the information necessary 
to pre-emptively establish whether certain types of behaviours may be in breach.  
Nevertheless, there are a limited number of cases in which courts have endeavoured to explore 
the content of the Duty.  
Proceeding in chronological order, the first such decision was Npower. Here the commercial 
agent claimed that the principal had breached Reg 4 by asking for a reduction in sales volume 
by 70% for a period of time, and increasing the price of the offered goods to levels that made 
it harder to conclude deals. 
Setting out the relevant legal principles, Cresswell J cited the definition of good faith offered 
by Lord Bingham in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc: “the 
requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. … good faith in this 
context is not an artificial or technical concept ... It looks to good standards of commercial 
morality and practice”.143 Thereafter, focusing specifically on the Duty, he posited that “when 
considering the impact of Regulation 4, the starting point must be the express written terms of 
the Agreement”.144  
Applying these principles to the facts before him he ruled that the principal had not breached 
the Duty. The instruction to reduce sales volume was not unreasonable in the relevant 
commercial context; similarly, the imposed price increases were a lawful enforcement of the 
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contract term granting the principal the right to make such variations, as long as they remained 
“reasonably competitive”. 
A different approach emerged a year later in Vick. In this case, the claimant argued, inter alia, 
that the obligation to act dutifully and in good faith was at least “as wide as the obligation 
implied on the part of both an employer and an employee in a contract of employment to act 
towards the other with mutual trust and confidence”,145 as defined by the House of Lords in 
Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA.146 HHJ Seymour QC accepted this 
submission and posited that the criteria established by the House of Lords to determine whether 
the mutual obligation of trust and confidence between the employer and the employee has been 
breached should also be applied to the Duty by analogy.147  
In Simpson, a commercial agent brought an action against his principal for a repudiatory breach 
of Reg 4 and sought compensation under Regs 8, 15 and 17.  At the outset, HHJ Alton 
cautiously posited that she did not deem it necessary to define the Duty; nevertheless, she then 
proceeded to formulate several general and abstract observations concerning the content of the 
Duty during her appraisal of the specific submissions of the litigants.  
Contemplating the type of conduct that would breach the Duty, she noted that “dishonest 
behaviour or a deliberate intent to damage the other party [would] very likely if not almost 
certainly … amount to a failure to act in good faith”;148 however, she added that “absence of 
dishonesty or deliberate intent to damage would not necessarily mean that the act in question 
could not amount to a failure to act in good faith. … Sharp practice in the context of treatment 
of the agent … falling short of dishonesty or intent to harm would also be likely to constitute a 
failure to act in good faith”.149 
Subsequently, in her analysis of the position of the principal, she held that Reg 4 did not create 
an overarching obligation “to treat the agent fairly, the assessment of which is to be made from 
the perspective of the agent and without … significant regard to the … entitlement of the 
principal to make what appear to be proper commercial decisions”.150 She compounded this, 
stating that “a decision on business matters, which might well impact on a particular agent or 
agents, which is within the range of commercial decisions open to a reasonable principal, and 
which is untainted by improper motive”151 would not amount to a breach of the Duty. 
Pivotally, HHJ Alton explicitly rejected the construction adopted in Vick, explaining that “to 
parallel independent commercial agents with employees for the purpose of determining the 
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nature of duties owed would be to seek to elide chalk with cheese and is unwarranted under the 
Regulations”.152 Conversely, she underlined the importance of determining the content of the 
Duty with regard to the specific commercial context. 
In Rossetti, the matter of contention was whether the commercial agent had breached the Duty 
by acting on behalf of competing principals, absent the principal’s consent. Mirroring the 
approach in Npower, Cranston J referenced Lord Bingham’s definition of “good faith” in 
Director General of Fair Trading,153 yet also stated that the content of the Duty had to be 
“moulded” with regard to the specific contractual context.  
Applying these principles to the facts before him, he concluded that a commercial agent acting 
on behalf of competing principals would be in breach of the Duty unless an express or implied 
term of the agency agreement granted leave to do so. Furthermore, such a term would have to 
“delineate what the commercial agent is to do when acting for competing principals so that 
each party knows what to expect with these duties, attributable by law to the relationship 
between them”.154 
Lastly, in Crocs Europe BV v Anderson,155 the Court of Appeal had to decide whether a breach 
of Reg 3 should always be treated as repudiatory. The appellant again submitted that an analogy 
should be drawn between the content of the Duty and the employer-employee mutual obligation 
of trust and confidence; on this basis, as a breach of the latter is always repudiatory, the same 
should be true for the Duty.156 In the leading judgment, Mummery LJ only examined the 
specific issue on appeal; by contrast, Bean J also considered the intension of the Duty in an 
obiter dictum.157 He generally posited that the “formulation of the obligations of a commercial 
agent [in Reg 3] does not seem to me to be materially different from the obligations owed by 
an employee (other than a director) to his employer”; applying this construction, he expressed 
doubts that the obligations owed by the commercial agents in the case before him would have 
varied in substance had they been employees of the principal.158  
Two alternative views of the content of the Duty emerge from the authorities. 
The first, observed in Vick and in Bean J’s obiter in Crocs, is that the content of the Duty should 
be construed by analogy to the employer-employee implied mutual obligation of trust and 
confidence under English law. 
It is respectfully suggested that this construction is not entirely persuasive on grounds of both 
method and substance. Confronted with the onus of construing the content of the Duty, both 
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HHJ Seymour QC and Bean J make recourse to an analogy with domestic employment law, 
rather than interpreting this notion in light of the words and purpose of the Directive, pursuant 
to the principle of consistent interpretation.159 Such reasoning negates the harmonisation aim 
pursued by the Directive and would completely undermine the uniform application of EU law 
if emulated by other Member State courts. 
With regard to substance, this construction is unsatisfactory because it fails to identify that the 
Duty is a general clause, attempting instead to force it into a straitjacket that fits one particular 
type of commercial agency relationship yet is ill-suited to many others. The proposed analogy 
between the Duty and the employer-employee mutual duty of trust and confidence is perhaps 
conceptually adequate if the commercial agency under consideration is functionally similar to 
an employment relationship, due to the characteristics of the specific agreement and the 
idiosyncrasies of the parties. However, this is not always the case. For example, if the principal 
is a large corporation, the commercial agent is a company with hundreds of employees, and 
their agency is governed by a sophisticated contract at arm’s length, the parallel with the 
employer-employee relationship falters and with it the aptness of the analogy.  
The second construction emerges from Npower, Rossetti and Simpson. Though not perfectly 
coextensive, these decisions expressly or implicitly state that the Duty requires parties to 
uphold an objective standard of conduct characterised by openness and fairness, based on 
commercial morality and practice. Dishonesty and intent to damage always fall foul of the 
Duty, as can “sharp practice” without malice. Whether a particular behaviour is in breach of 
Regs 3-4 must be appraised on a case-by-case basis, concretising the aforementioned abstract 
standard of conduct in light of the terms of the agency agreement and the relevant commercial 
context.160 
From a methodological standpoint, both Npower and Rossetti refer to Lord Bingham’s 
definition of good faith, formulated in relation to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract 
Regulations 1999.161 In his judgment, his Lordship had expressly stated that good faith was a 
notion of EU law with an autonomous meaning.162 Therefore, this interpretation carries over to 
Npower and Rossetti, acknowledging in turn that the notion of good faith must be construed 
consistently across domestic legislation that implements EU private law legislative acts.  
With regard to substance, these authorities construe the Duty as a general clause based on the 
broad and abstract notions of openness, fairness and commercial practice, which must be 
concretised in relation to the agency in question. Though they do not expound these concepts 
in detail, Npower, Rossetti, and Simpson convey the idea that co-operation on the part of 
commercial agents and principals is required, beyond mere abstention from obstructive 
behaviour. These decisions also highlight that a balance has to be struck between pursuit of 
self-interest and realisation of the commercial agency. Crucially, the objective intentions of the 
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parties and the relevant commercial context are at the forefront of the judicial reasoning in 
these authorities.  
This approach is welcome as it methodologically heeds the European dimension of the 
Regulations and substantively offers the flexibility necessary to cater to the varied nature of 
commercial agency.  
Alongside these two judicial constructions, a third has been proposed by Saintier and Scholes. 
They suggest that the standard of conduct mandated by the Duty requires parties to “act so as 
to best advance the joint interests of both parties. … it is not permitted for either party to have 
regard to its own selfish interest and nothing more, but a party is not obliged to put the other 
side’s interests to the exclusion of his own either. Each party has to achieve a balance and have 
regard to both”.163 They further argue that “in those respects in which the commercial agent is 
a fiduciary in English law, he is now fiduciary not exclusively for the principal but for the 
principal and himself jointly, and has to act in the best interests of both of them”.164 
Though interesting, this construction is not persuasive.  
Saintier and Scholes’ thesis is inspired by the French doctrine of “mandate of common interest” 
and built on analogies with the English law of partnerships and the implied employer-employee 
mutual obligation of trust and confidence. The European dimension of the Regulations is 
completely neglected. The Duty is recognised as normatively originating from the EU legal 
order, yet the principle of consistent interpretation is not considered.  
Beyond these methodological blemishes, the substance of Saintier and Scholes’ submission is 
grounded in neither the Directive nor the Regulations. There are no textual elements suggesting 
that the parties to a commercial agency agreement must prioritise its realisation over their own 
self-interest. Equally, from a teleological standpoint, there is no support for a conceptualisation 
of the Duty that would severely restrict the freedom of enterprise165 of commercial agents and 
principals and which would be unworkable in commercial agencies structured as arm’s length 
relationships. Moreover, the suggestion that Reg 3 renders commercial agents concurrently 
fiduciaries to both their principals and the commercial agency is troubling, as it fails to consider 
the possibility that the interests of the two might conflict and implies that principals are subject 
to an equivalent obligation due to the reciprocal nature of the Duty.  
Thus, the content of the Duty remains a point of contention. It has been argued that the approach 
adopted in Npower, Rossetti and Simpson is preferable both in method and substance. It is to 
be hoped that UK courts will follow this path in the future and perhaps develop it further, by 
fleshing out criteria for the concretisation of the Duty in line with the Directive. 
F. The consequences of breach of the Duty  
                                                 
163 Saintier and Scholes (n 13) 106.  
164 ibid.  
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The Regulations do not contain provisions addressing the consequences of a breach of the Duty, 
offering but a hollow reflection of the Directive. Reg 5(2) does establish that “the law 
applicable to the contract shall govern the consequence of breach of the rights and obligations 
under regulations 3 and 4 above”. However, this is a private international law rule that signals 
the relevant connecting factor by which to ascertain the applicable law, and as such does not 
regulate the manner in which breaches should be treated substantively.  
Two possible, alternative hypotheses are possible to bridge this legislative chasm. The first 
assumes that Reg 3-4 incorporate the Duty into all commercial agency contracts as a statutory 
implied term (henceforth “the implied term hypothesis”). If this is the case, the consequences 
of a breach depend on whether this implied stipulation is deemed a condition, a warranty or an 
innominate term. The second supposes that Regs 3-4 articulate the Duty as a statutory right 
overlaying the contractual position (henceforth “the overlaying right hypothesis”). Under this 
construction, it must be determined which statutory remedies are available in the event of a 
breach and the manner in which they operate; for example, if damages are awarded, the relevant 
measure of assessment.  
In the past, UK courts have been reluctant to confront this matter squarely.166 In its recent Crocs 
decision, by contrast, the Court of Appeal took a discernible stance. The case involved a breach 
of Reg 3.167 Though he did not venture into a classificatory exercise, Bean J’s reasoning 
assumed that the Duty was a statutory implied term of the contract. He concluded that it should 
be deemed an innominate term and the consequences for breach established accordingly.168 
Mummery LJ classified the breach in question as contractual and emphasised his agreement 
with Bean J’s reasoning.169 Hughes LJ concurred.170 
Unsurprisingly, commentators have expressed diverging views on this complex issue.  
Saintier and Scholes support the implied term hypothesis and suggest that the Duty should be 
treated as a condition due to its “fundamental importance” to the commercial agency 
relationship.171 Bennett has voiced approval for the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Crocs, 
remarking that the decision to classify the Duty as an innominate term is fitting, “in view of 
the variable nature, extent and gravity of potential breaches”.172 By contrast, Randolph and 
Davey favour the overlaying right hypothesis, drawing an analogy with the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. They posit that “the rights set out in Regulation 17 are 
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statutory non-contractual remedies” and argue that “it would be … strange … if other elements 
of the Regulations were intended to operate on a contractual basis”.173  
As the Regulations are silent on the consequences of a breach of the Duty and its contractual 
or statutory nature, it is particularly challenging to decipher the “legislative intention”.174 
As a preliminary observation, it is submitted that both the aforementioned hypotheses are 
compliant with EU law. Both offer a suitable implementation of the Directive, as the EU 
legislature did not prescribe a specific manner in which the Obligation should be transposed 
into national law.175 Furthermore, with regard to adequate enforcement of the rights established 
in the Directive, both constructions ensure remedial protection compliant with the effectiveness 
and equivalence requirements.176  
In the absence of EU law related concerns, the conundrum in question must be resolved 
pursuant to UK canons of statutory construction.177 While the interpretative approaches more 
commonly relied upon by courts provide little guidance,178 a “consequential construction”179 
decisively favours the implied terms hypothesis.  
The overlaying right hypothesis is not untenable per se. However, it would require courts to 
articulate autonomously a statutory remedial framework to regulate the consequences of a 
breach of the Duty. Effectively, the judiciary would be required to enact a supplementary 
section to the Regulations. This would be an impractical, if not unworkable result,180 
particularly in light of the traditional reluctance of UK courts to assume the role of legislator. 
By contrast, the implied term hypothesis would merely require courts to apply the general 
doctrines of contract law to determine the consequences of a breach of the Duty. This would 
be a relatively certain and simple outcome.   
Having determined that the implied term hypothesis is preferable, it is still necessary to 
establish whether the Duty should be treated as a condition, a warranty or an innominate term. 
It is submitted that Bean J’s reasoning in Crocs is entirely convincing on this issue. The flexible 
nature of innominate terms is best suited for the open texture character of the Duty, in respect 
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of which only some breaches will deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole benefit 
of the agreement, while others will not.  
4. The impact of the Duty on the law of agency  
Having charted the confines of the Duty, it is possible to measure the impact of this notion on 
the pre-existing legal spheres of agents and principals at common law.  
A. Commercial agents 
At common law, commercial agents are a species of the broader genus of agents; as such, they 
owe their principals both fiduciary obligations and duties of performance.  
As fiduciaries, commercial agents must act with single-minded loyalty, prioritising their 
principals’ interests over their own.181 This equitable requirement translates into two broad 
duties: “the agent must avoid any conflict that can be avoided between its own interests and 
those of its principal and must resolve any conflict that does arise in favour of the principal”; 
and “the agent is prohibited from obtaining any benefit from the agency that has not been 
authorised by the principal”.182 Fiduciary duties are proscriptive and prophylactic in nature: 
they tell the fiduciary what he must not do, not what he ought to do.183 
Commercial agents also owe duties of performance alongside their fiduciary obligations. The 
exact scope and intensity of these duties depend on the particulars of the agency agreement, 
and, consequentially, contract construction. Nevertheless, they can be summarised as follows: 
the duty to perform the undertaking, the duty to comply with the principal’s subsequent 
instructions, and the duty to act with the due skill and care normally exercised by agents in 
similar circumstances. Duties of performance positively dictate what the agent must to do in 
performance of the agency.184  
The prevailing view among commentators is that the Duty has no meaningful impact on the 
legal position of commercial agents, as it “largely replicates” the fiduciary and performance 
duties owed at common law.185 On one hand, any conduct forbidden by the Duty is also 
proscribed by fiduciary obligations because the standard of conduct mandated by the latter is 
more exacting than that imposed by the former. On the other, any behaviour that is positively 
prescribed by the Duty is also required by the duties of performance at common law. 
It is respectfully submitted that, though aspects of this thesis are convincing, it fails to provide 
a comprehensive assessment of the issues under scrutiny.  
As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that fiduciary and performance duties do not 
extend to pre-contractual negotiations and remedies, and English contract law does not 
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generally dictate a standard of conduct comparable to that mandated by the Duty.186 
Consequently, if, contrary to what has been argued above, the scope of the Duty were construed 
to encompass these phases of the agency relationship, this would mark a radical departure from 
the extant agency law framework. 
However, even accepting the submission that the scope of the Duty only covers performance 
of the commercial agency, the interaction between Reg 3 and the pre-existing common law 
agency rules is more complex than it would initially appear. 
Firstly, parties can modify or waive fiduciary obligations, whereas the Duty is not derogable. 
Consequently, even if the agreement explicitly allows for actions otherwise proscribed by 
fiduciary duties, a commercial agent must still perform the contract abiding to the standard of 
conduct mandated by the Duty.   
Secondly, the scope and content of the duties of performance at common law differ from those 
of the Duty. The duties of performance have been developed at common law to tackle 
determinate issues; as a result, they are a piecemeal set of rules and their scope is confined to 
specific occurrences of the agency relationship. By contrast, the Duty permeates the 
relationship between commercial agent and principal completely, imposing a standard of 
conduct on the performance of their agreement. With regard to content, an analysis of the 
relevant authorities suggests that duties of performance demand a standard of conduct that is 
not analogous to that mandated by the Duty.187 For example, the former only require that 
unfettered contractual discretion be exercised in a manner that is not subjectively “capricious, 
arbitrary or … perverse”,188 while the Duty insists on an objective standard of conduct based 
on honesty, openness and regard for the interests of the other party to the transaction.  
It is thus submitted that while performance duties and fiduciary obligations may overlap with 
the Duty, they never completely obscure it; the amount of light gleaming through will vary but 
can be significant in circumstances in which the parties have waived fiduciary duties or the 
commercial agent is awarded ample contractual discretion. Accordingly, English and Scottish 
courts reviewing the legal sphere of a commercial agent would be best advised to heed carefully 
both the rights and obligations arising at common law, and the Duty.  
B. Principals 
At common law, principals owe their agents indemnification for liabilities incurred in carrying 
out the agency and remuneration pursuant to their agreement. Discharge of these obligations is 
generally secured by a lien over any property of the principal in the possession of the agent. 
                                                 
186 Classically, see Raphael Powell, ‘Good faith in contract’ (1956) 9 CLP 16; Johan Steyn, ‘The Role of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy?’ [1991] Denning LJ 131.  
187 See Watts and Reynolds (n 13) 6-015-6-021. 
188 Ludgate Insurance Co Ltd v Citibank NA [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 221 [35]; Socimer International Bank Ltd v 
Standard Bank London Ltd (No2) [2008] EWCA 116, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 558 [66]. See Richard Hooley, 
‘Controlling contractual discretion’ (2013) 72 CLJ 65. 
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Save for these exceptions, general doctrines governing contract performance apply 
unaltered.189  
Conceptually, the impact of the Duty on the pre-existing legal framework for principals is not 
problematic to chart. The introduction of this mandatory standard of conduct throughout 
performance of the agency breaks a certain amount of new ground, departing from the generally 
more adversarial stance of the common law. In practice, the effects of this reform will vary, 
depending on the terms of the agreement in question and the relevant commercial context. 
Nevertheless, as principals are required to collaborate pro-actively with their agents, failure to 
communicate adequately and generally inert behaviour might be held to breach Reg 4; equally, 
the obligation to consider the legitimate expectations of agents will limit the extent to which a 
principal can exercise contractual discretion or stand steadfastly on their rights. 
5. Conclusion  
EU law has introduced good faith to the common law of agency. This paper has endeavoured 
to analyse this general clause and assess its impact on the pre-existing legal framework. 
The first step was to chart precisely the obligation to act “dutifully and in good faith” 
established in Arts 3-5 of the Directive. The submission was advanced that these provisions 
engender a general clause that requires principals and commercial agents to perform their 
agency in adherence to a mandatory standard of conduct, based on honesty, openness and 
consideration for the interest of the other party. Though this requirement must be concretised 
in light of the specificities of the relationship at hand, positive co-operation and abstention from 
the exploitation of asymmetries were suggested as functional normative precepts for this 
purpose.  
Subsequently, attention turned to the manner in which English and Scottish courts have 
interpreted and applied this imported duty. It was shown that, with few exceptions, the scope 
and function of this requirement have not given rise to significant difficulties. By contrast, the 
case law contains profoundly diverging conceptualisations of the content to be attributed to this 
mandatory standard of conduct. It was submitted that the construction articulated in Npower, 
Rossetti and Simpson is preferable as it is substantively suited to the broad-ranging nature of 
relationships covered by commercial agency and consistent with the words and purpose of the 
Directive. 
Finally, it was posited that the pre-existing common law agency rules have been meaningfully 
modified but not radically overhauled by the introduction of this obligation to act “dutifully 
and in good faith”. For principals, the standard of conduct imposed by the Regulations marks 
a conceptually significant departure from the pre-existing common law regime; its practical 
incidence, however, will vary depending on the idiosyncrasies of the agency agreement in 
question. With regard to commercial agents, a distinction must be drawn between the 
proscriptive and prescriptive dimensions of this novel duty. The proscriptive dimension 
partially coincides with the scope of fiduciary duties, yet still imposes meaningful reform. The 
                                                 
189 Comprehensively, Watts and Reynolds (n 13) 7-001-7-002. 
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prescriptive dimension engenders onuses different and ulterior to those previously imposed by 
performance obligations at common law and thus imports an even more pronounced recast of 
the legal sphere of agents.  
 
